The Commitment Contract With a Stick
Stake money on your own behaviour, appoint a referee, and route the forfeit to a cause you despise.
- Difficulty
- Easy
- Time to result
- ~weeks to results
- Steps
- 5
- Confidence
- 85%
This is the sharpest accountability mechanism Lieberman describes: a formal commitment contract in which you deposit a sum of money with a third party, name the behaviour you will perform, appoint a referee to verify it, and pre-specify a negative consequence that fires when you fail. The design insight is that the forfeit must genuinely sting - not a neutral loss, but money going somewhere you actively hate. Lieberman treats this as a stick where most exercise advice offers only carrots, and is candid that it sits at the extreme end of what he would recommend. It works because it converts a private intention into an externally verified obligation with a cost attached.
Origin
Lieberman describes it in his book through a friend in San Francisco who was struggling to exercise and signed up to a commitment-contract company (stickK.com), depositing roughly $1,000 and naming her husband as referee.
Core principles
- 01A private intention with no consequence is not a commitment.
- 02The forfeit must be something you genuinely hate, not merely a loss.
- 03Verification belongs to a third party, not to you.
- 04The consequence must be defined in advance, while motivation is high.
- 05This is a stick; it complements, but does not replace, the social rewards that make activity enjoyable.
How to run it
- 1
Define one behaviour in verifiable terms
Specify a single behaviour precisely enough that a third party can rule on it without argument - a set number of miles walked every day, or a stated number of sessions per week. Vague goals cannot be refereed.
Pro tip Pick a behaviour you can perform on your worst day, not your best one. The contract punishes the floor, not the ceiling.
- 2
Stake money you would rather not lose
Deposit a meaningful sum with the contract service, which holds it in escrow. Lieberman's example uses around $1,000 - large enough that the prospect of losing it is real.
Watch out Do not stake an amount that would cause genuine financial harm if you failed repeatedly. The mechanism should sting, not damage you.
- 3
Appoint a referee who will actually report you
Name a person who sees your behaviour and will report honestly - in the example, the friend's husband. The referee's job is to tell the service what happened, which removes self-reporting from the loop entirely.
Pro tip Choose someone with no incentive to protect your feelings.
Watch out A referee who does not want to upset you silently destroys the whole mechanism.
- 4
Point the forfeit at something you genuinely hate
Pre-commit the money to a destination you find objectionable. In Lieberman's example, each missed week sends $50 to the National Rifle Association, an organisation his friend hates with a burning passion. The aversion is the engine.
Pro tip The stronger and more specific the loathing, the smaller the sum needs to be.
Watch out Lieberman himself calls this on the extreme side and says he would not recommend it to everybody - do not deploy it as your first intervention.
- 5
Run it, and check whether the stick has become unnecessary
Execute for a defined period, then review. If the behaviour has become habitual and socially supported, taper the contract; if not, keep it running.
Pro tip A softer version of this same mechanism is simply hiring a trainer, which Lieberman says is essentially a way of making yourself accountable.
In the wild
A friend of Lieberman's in San Francisco was struggling to exercise, so she used a commitment-contract service, staking roughly $1,000 and committing to walk a set number of miles every day. Her husband acted as referee. If she failed, $50 that week would be sent to the National Rifle Association - an organisation she detests for its role in blocking gun control legislation in the United States.
→ Every time Lieberman asks whether she has kept up the walking, she replies that the NRA is not getting a penny. He describes the contract as very effective for her.
Lieberman notes that the everyday equivalent of this mechanism is simply hiring a personal trainer. The trainer's real function, in his framing, is not programming but accountability - somebody is expecting you, and notices when you do not appear.
→ Accountability is achieved without a financial forfeit or an adversarial stake, at the cost of a weaker consequence.
Common mistakes
Choosing a forfeit that is merely neutral
Donating a forfeit to a charity you like, or simply losing the money into a void, removes the aversive drive. The mechanism works because the destination is hated, which is why the NRA choice was effective.
Acting as your own referee
Self-verification collapses the contract back into an intention. The whole design depends on a third party who reports what actually happened.
Deploying the extreme version first
Lieberman explicitly says the NRA-style contract is on the extreme side and that he would not recommend it to everybody. Starting here rather than with social accountability risks a punishing relationship with an activity you are trying to make rewarding.
Is it for you?
Best for
People who have already tried social and habit-based approaches without success, and who have a specific, verifiable behaviour they want to lock in.
Not ideal for
Beginners still building a positive relationship with movement, anyone for whom a financial forfeit would cause real hardship, and people without a trustworthy referee available.
From the transcript
“it's a commitment contract where you send like $1,000 to them and they keep it in a bank account”
“you set up a referee and and you agree that I'm going to not smoke or this or that or the other or in this…”
“she's made a commitment contract that that stings, right? That really hurts.”
“She says oh no, the NRA isn't getting a penny.”
From the episode
Harvard Professor: "10,000 Steps A Day" Is A LIE! Revealing The 7 BIG LIES About Exercise, Sleep, Running, Cancer & Sugar!!! Daniel Lieberman
Harvard Professor