Post-Intervention Stability Test
Plan the protected transition before removing an incumbent regime
- Difficulty
- Expert
- Time to result
- ~months to results
- Steps
- 5
- Confidence
- 95%
In discussing Iran, Kisin separates the desire to remove an oppressive leadership from the harder question of what protects the next political settlement. He asks who would stop remnants of the old regime from disrupting a transition, whether outside forces would be required, and whether the intervening public would support that commitment. He connects the concern to outcomes in Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and Egypt, arguing that replacing a leader can produce another unstable or unwanted order. The reusable test forces planners to specify the successor, the source of legitimacy, likely spoilers, the security guarantee, and the path to durable local control before treating intervention as a solution. It does not decide whether intervention is morally justified; it tests whether the promised aftermath is operationally credible.
Origin
Extracted from The Diary of a CEO. While discussing possible support for Iranian protesters, Konstantin Kisin asks who would protect a democratic transition from remnants of the existing regime.
Core principles
- 01Removing a harmful incumbent does not create a stable successor
- 02A transition needs protection from remnants and rival factions
- 03Legitimate leadership must be able to remain in power
- 04Public support for intervention may not extend to long-term enforcement
How to run it
- 1
Define the End State
Describe the political or organisational settlement intervention is meant to create. Specify who gets to choose the next leadership and what legitimacy means in that setting.
Watch out Removing the incumbent is an action, not an end state.
- 2
Name the Successor Process
Identify the people or institutions capable of governing during transition. Explain how they gain authority rather than assuming recognition will follow automatically.
Pro tip Distinguish a symbolic opposition figure from an administration able to govern.
- 3
Map the Spoilers
List armed remnants, rival factions, external sponsors, and institutions that could block or capture the transition. Estimate their incentives and capabilities.
Watch out The old order may survive through networks even after its leaders leave.
- 4
Secure the Transition
Name the force or coalition responsible for protecting the new process. Confirm its authority, resources, rules, duration, and domestic support.
Watch out A promise of rescue without sustained capacity can expose supporters to greater danger.
- 5
Design the Handover
Set observable conditions for transferring security and authority to durable local institutions. Include contingencies if the successor loses legitimacy or spoilers regain strength.
Pro tip Test the plan against a less favourable successor than the one preferred.
In the wild
Kisin considers a hypothetical removal of Iran's current leadership and a transition involving the former Shah's son. He then asks who would protect that process from remnants of the old regime, noting that he sees little US appetite for troops on the ground.
→ The hypothetical reveals the missing security commitment between removing a regime and sustaining a democratic outcome.
Kisin says Egypt removed an authoritarian leader, elected the Muslim Brotherhood, and then saw pressure for military rule to return. He uses the sequence to show that an election alone does not settle the post-removal order.
→ The example illustrates how a transition can produce a result that participants then contest.
Common mistakes
Treating Removal as the Finish Line
The power, security, and legitimacy questions become more urgent after the incumbent falls.
Assuming Support Will Persist
A public may support limited action but reject the long commitment needed to protect a transition.
Ignoring Unwanted Electoral Outcomes
A legitimate process can elevate actors the interveners dislike, creating a new test of their stated principles.
Is it for you?
Best for
It is best for regime change, leadership removal, institutional turnarounds, and any intervention that creates a contested succession.
Not ideal for
It is not ideal as a reason to delay immediate protection from an imminent threat when emergency action is independently justified.
From the transcript
“Who is there protecting that process from being disrupted by the remnants of the old regime?”
“hopefully they have a plan for what happens after that”
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